This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.
CHINA RAILWAYS,
CONFIDENTIAL.
[May 26.]
SECTION 2.
[18043]
(No. 188.) Sir,
No. 1.
Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.(Received May 26.)
Peking, April 27, 1908.
I REGRET that my absence from Peking has prevented me from replying at an earlier date to your despatch No. 55 of the 3rd February last on the subject of projected railway communication between Burma and Yünnan.
My despatch No. 38 of the 22nd January last will have shown you that my views regarding the prospect of obtaining Railway Concessions in China are in agreement with those which you have already expressed to the India Office, and I shall therefore confine my observations to what appears to be the practical question at the moment—the construction of a railway from Bhamo to Tengyueh, and the steps which should be taken to secure this object.
While continuing to hold the Chinese Government to the pledge which they gave to Sir E. Satow in March 1902, and reserving our right to fall back upon that undertaking at any time, we might, I think, now approach them with the view of arriving at an arrangement regarding the Bhamo-Tengyueh line. This line is 122 miles in length, about one-third of which is in British and the remainder in Chinese territory. The total cost is estimated at 850,144l., of which the British section represents 283,381l. and the Chinese 566,762l., approximately.
Even if they could obtain a Concession for this line from China at present, the Government of India are apparently not prepared to undertake the construction for the next two or three years; but if the Chinese authorities wish to participate in the enterprise, the Government of India will be willing to accept a scheme involving such participation and co-operation, providing that efficiency in the construction and working of the railway is secured. This latter suggestion appears to me to afford a basis for a possible arrangement.
The Chinese Government are certain to claim the right of constructing the portion of the railway which is within Chinese territory, and provided they undertook to do so within a specified limit of time under conditions similar to those recorded in the Tien-tsin-Pukow and Shanghae-Hangchow-Ningpo Railway Agreements, the Indian Government would have practically the same security for the efficient construction and working of the railway as is enjoyed by the bondholders of these two loans.
It is, of course, assumed that the Indian Government would be prepared to construct their section of the line simultaneously, and that the procedure in this respect would be the same as that which is now being followed by the Hong Kong Government in the case of the Canton-Kowloon Railway.
The financing of the Chinese portion of the line might present some difficulties, as the undertaking is not likely, I imagine, to prove remunerative for some years, and China is naturally very reluctant to build railways on her remote borders when the populous regions of the Empire are still unprovided with similar means of communication. But this should not prove an insuperable obstacle, and if the scheme were accepted in principle, the necessary funds could possibly be raised by a loan guaranteed upon the revenues of the province, as was done in the case of the Tien-tsin-Pukow line. Failing this, it would be desirable to know whether there is any prospect of the Indian Government making a loan to China on terms similar to those on which the Hong Kong Government made, in 1905, a loan of 1,100,000l. to his Excellency Chang Chih-tung for the redemption of the Canton-Hankow line.
In view of the changing conditions which govern railway construction in this country, and the attitude of the Government and people towards foreign participation in such enterprises, it is impossible to sketch out beforehand any hard-and-fast scheme which is likely to meet with acceptance at any particular moment; but the above represents roughly an outline of the basis on which negotiations appear to me to have the best chance of success.
Much would depend upon the attitude of the provincial authorities, and recent indications afford little hope of support from the Viceroy of the Yun Kuei provinces, but
[2972 cc-2]
73
:
This Document is the Property of His Britannic Majesty's Government.Į
CHINA RAILWAYS,
CONFIDENTIAL.
[May 26.]
SECTION 2.
[18043]
(No. 188.) Sir,
No. 1.
Sir J. Jordan to Sir Edward Grey.(Received May 26.)
Peking, April 27, 1908. I REGRET that my absence from Peking has prevented me from replying at an earlier date to your despatch No. 55 of the 3rd February last on the subject of projected railway communication between Burma and Yünnan.
My despatch No. 38 of the 22nd January last will have shown you that my views regarding the prospect of obtaining Railway Concessions in China are in agreement with those which you have already expressed to the India Office, and I shall therefore confine my observations to what appears to be the practical question at the moment- the construction of a railway from Bhamo to Tengyueh, and the steps which should be taken to secure this object.
While continuing to hold the Chinese Government to the pledge which they gave to Sir E. Satow in March 1902, and reserving our right to fall back upon that under- taking at any time, we might, I think, now approach them with the view of arriving at an arrangement regarding the Bhamo-Tengyueh line. This line is 122 miles in length, about one-third of which is in British and the remainder in Chinese territory. The total cost is estimated at 850,144, of which the British section represents 283,3817. and the Chinese 566,762, approximately. Even if they could obtain a Concession for this line from China at present, the Government of India are apparently not prepared to undertake the construction for the next two or three years; but if the Chinese authorities wish to participate in the enterprise, the Government of India will be willing to accept a scheme involving such participation and co-operation, providing that efficiency in the construction and working of the railway is secured. This latter suggestion appears to me to afford a basis for a possible arrangement. The Chinese Government are certain to claim the right of constructing the portion of the railway which is within Chinese territory, and provided they undertook to do so within a specified limit of time under conditions similar to those recorded in the Tien-tsin- Pukow and Shanghae-Hangchow-Ningpo Railway Agreements, the Indian Govern- ment would have practically the same security for the efficient construction and working of the railway as is enjoyed by the bondholders of these two loans.
It is, of course, assumed that the Indian Government would be prepared to construct their section of the line simultaneously, and that the procedure in this respect would be the same as that which is now being followed by the Hong Kong Government in the case of the Canton-Kowloon Railway.
The financing of the Chinese portion of the line might present some difficulties, as the undertaking is not likely, I imagine, to prove remunerative for some years, and China is naturally very reluctant to build railways on her remote borders when the populous regions of the Empire are still unprovided with similar means of communica- tion. But this should not prove an insuperable obstacle, and if the scheme were accepted in principle, the necessary funds could possibly be raised by a loan guaranteed upon the revenues of the province, as was done in the case of the Tien-tsin-Pukow line. Failing this, it would be desirable to know whether there is any prospect of the Indian Government making a loan to China on terms similar to those on which the Hong Kong Government made, in 1905, a loan of 1,100,000l. to his Excellency Chang Chib-tung for the redemption of the Canton-Hankow line.
In view of the changing conditions which govern railway construction in this country, and the attitude of the Government and people towards foreign participation. in such enterprises, it is impossible to sketch out beforehand any hard-and-fast scheme which is likely to meet with acceptance at any particular moment; but the above represents roughly an outline of the basis on which negotiations appear to me to have the best chance of success.
Much would depend upon the attitude of the provincial authorities, and recent indications afford little hope of support from the Viceroy of the Yun Kuei provinces, but
[2972 cc-2]
73
gt
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.